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In real-life implementations of quantum key distribution (QKD), the physical systems with un-
wanted imperfections would be exploited by an eavesdropper. Based on imperfections in the de-
tectors, detector control attacks have been successfully launched on several QKD systems, and
attracted widespread concerns. Here, we propose a robust countermeasure against these attacks
just by introducing a variable attenuator in front of the detector. This countermeasure is not only
effective against the attacks with blinding light, but also robust against the attacks without blinding
light which are more concealed and threatening. Different from previous technical improvements,
the single photon detector in our countermeasure model is treated as a blackbox, and the eaves-
dropper can be detected by statistics of the detection and error rates of the QKD system. Besides
theoretical proof, the countermeasure is also supported by an experimental demonstration. Our
countermeasure is general in sense that it is independent of the technical details of the detector,
and can be easily applied to the existing QKD systems.
PACS numbers: 03.67.Dd
I. INTRODUCTION
Quantum key distribution (QKD) is one of the most
promising applications of quantum information. It en-
ables two parties, Alice and Bob, to exchange key bits,
whose security has been theoretically proved [1–5]. Un-
fortunately, real-life QKD systems still can be hacked
due to the imperfection of the devices. Several kinds
of attacks have been reported, such as photon-number-
splitting (PNS) attack [6, 7], phase-remapping attack
[8, 9], Trojan-horse attack [10], time-shift attack [11, 12],
wavelength-dependent attack [13] and detector control
attack [14–24]. In order to defense these attacks, many
countermeasures are also proposed, some of which are
very effective and can even perfectly defense the corre-
sponding attack, for example, decoy-state method is a
perfect solution against PNS attack [25–28].
Recently, most attacks focus on the measurement
equipment, especially on single-photon detectors (SPDs).
Among which detector control attack is the most fatal
one and has attracted lots of attentions [14–24]. To im-
plement a detector control attack, Eve randomly chooses
bases to measure the quantum states sent from Alice,
then resends the results using trigger light with specific
optical power. Due to the control effect of trigger pulses,
the outputs of Bob’s detectors are nearly identical to
Eve’s. This will cause zero or little extra error bits,
and Eve can obtain a copy of raw keys without being
revealed by legitimate users. Note that not all detector-
related attacks belong to the detector control attack, such
∗ wshuang@ustc.edu.cn
as the detector dead time attack [29] and time-shift at-
tack [11, 12] are not within the scope of the detector
control attack. In one of the most typical experiments
[14], Eve first uses bright continuous-wave illumination
to blind the SPDs, and converts them into linear detec-
tors which are not sensitive to single photon. Then Eve
can fully control the SPDs by sending trigger pulses that
superimposed with the blinding light. There are a se-
ries of experiments using both blinding light and trigger
light, such as continuous-wave blinding attack [14, 15],
thermal blinding attack [16, 21], sinkhole blinding attack
[16]. Furthermore, Eve need only send trigger light pulses
to directly control SPDs, such as after-gate attack [17],
faint-after-gate attack [18], detector control attack under
specific laser damage [19]. These detector control attacks
without blinding light are more concealed and threaten-
ing to QKD systems than the ones with blinding light.
In this sense, more attentions should be paid to detector
control attack without blinding light.
There are various countermeasures to defense the de-
tector control attack. The most ideal one is device-
independent scheme [30, 31], which excludes all the im-
perfections of the devices, but still impractical to appli-
cations of real-world use under current techniques. The
most effective one is measurement-device-independent
scheme [32, 33], but it requires a Bell-state measurement
of two independent remote laser sources, which is ex-
perimentally challenging. The other methods are mainly
focusing on the technical improvements in SPDs [34–37]
or measurement devices [38–41], or passively monitor-
ing parameters [42–48]. However, these countermeasures
may not be provably secure because the characteristics
of actual devices and implementations are not under con-
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2sideration in the security proofs [43, 49]. Furthermore,
some countermeasures may be available to a kind of SPDs
[50] or effective to one specific attack, but not all types
of detector control attack. For example, the method of
monitoring the photocurrent of the avalanche photodi-
ode is effective to find the detector control attack with
blinding light, but will fail to detect the recent avalanche-
transition region attack [24]. Another lately proposed
countermeasure is to randomly remove gates and check
the clicks in the absence of the gates [35], while Eve can
still implement traceless control of SPDs [51], since the
method causes changes of both the gate signal leakage
and gain factor in SPD circuits.
To defense detector control attack, we propose a ro-
bust countermeasure model by introducing a variable at-
tenuator (VA) in front of the SPD. With the random
change of attenuation of VA and the analysis of the cor-
responding detection events and errors, the countermea-
sure criteria is proven effective against the detector con-
trol attack without blinding light. An experiment is also
demonstrated to support the effectiveness of the VA-SPD
countermeasure. If Eve implements the detector control
attack with blinding light, she would introduce new fin-
gerprints in addition to high photocurrent, and trigger
the alarm of the QKD system.
II. COUNTERMEASURE MODEL
The implementation procedure of our countermeasure
model is shown in Fig. 1(a), a VA is placed in front of
the SPD, and its attenuation can be randomly changed
among several values. Note that the number of attenua-
tion values is at least two, and the value difference is 3 dB
(see APPENDIX A for an explanation of the necessity of
3 dB). In this paper, the number of attenuation values
is two, 0 dB and 3 dB, respectively. The countermeasure
model is named as VA-SPD, which is suitable for different
kinds of SPDs, such as photomultiplier tubes (PMT), su-
perconducting single-photon detector (SSPD) and semi-
conductor detectors (Si SPD, InGaAs/InP SPD). In the
model, SPD is treated as a blackbox, which only has two
ports: an optical signal input and a detection output. It
is not necessary to modify the internal circuits or monitor
the technical parameters in the SPD. So our countermea-
sure model is applicable for prepare-and-measure QKD
systems, just by directly replacing the original SPD with
a VA-SPD.
In order to explicitly illustrate the procedure of the
proposed countermeasure model, we apply the VA-SPD
to a typical polarization-encoding BB84 system with pas-
sive measurement bases selection, which has been hacked
by several attacks [13, 15, 29, 52–55]. As shown in Fig.
1(b), Alice prepares and sends Bob a sequence of polar-
ization states, each randomly chosen from four polariza-
tion states {H, V , +, −}, H and V are horizontal and
vertical polarization states, respectively. + and − denote
+45◦ and −45◦ linear polarization states, respectively.
For each state, Bob passively and randomly chooses one
of the two measurement bases — Z (or rectilinear) basis
and X (or diagonal) basis — to project the input photon
into one of these four polarization states. At Bob’s site,
each VA-SPD corresponds to one polarization state, and
the attenuation value of VA in each VA-SPD is randomly
set to 0 dB or 3 dB. After the announcement of basis
choices, we can get the detection rate and quantum bit
error rate (QBER) for each detector. Different from the
original system, two kinds of results could be obtained
for two values of VA in the VA-SPD. Here, for each VA-
SPD, {R0, R3} and {e0, e3} denote the detection rates
and QBERs with 0 dB and 3 dB attenuation value, re-
spectively.
FIG. 1. (a) Schematic of the countermeasure model. The VA-
SPD model consists of a variable attenuator(VA) and a single
photon detector(SPD). (b) Application of the VA-SPD model
to a polarization-encoding BB84 system. PC, polarization
controller; BS, beamsplitter; PBS, polarization beamsplitter.
In almost all BB84 QKD systems, weak coherent states
sources are widely used. The photon number of each
pulse prepared by Alice follows a Poisson distribution[28].
Suppose the expected photon number of each pulse is µ,
the overall transmission and detection efficiency between
Alice and Bob is η, and the background rate is Y0, then
the detection rate is given by
R = 1− (1− Y0)e−µη, (1)
which means the probability that Bob gets one detection
count when Alice sends one pulse. For each detector, we
can get similar expressions, the only differences are the
meaning of η and Y0. Thus, the ratio between detection
rates of one VA-SPD with 0 dB and 3 dB attenuation
certainly satisfies
1 < α ≡ R0
R3
< 2. (2)
Additionally, the QBERs with 0 dB and 3 dB attenua-
tion should be less than the threshold to generate secure
3keys. We have
{e0, e3} < eth, (3)
where eth is the threshold of QBER, and is 11% for the
four-state BB84 system [56–58].
In the BB84 QKD system employed VA-SPDs, the re-
lationships of the detection rate Eq. (2) and QBER Eq.
(3) between 0 dB and 3 dB attenuation should be held
simultaneously. Here, we prove that the relationships of
Eq. (2) and Eq. (3) cannot be satisfied simultaneously
if the system was hacked by the detector control attack.
This criteria would be a trace to find the detector control
attack. And in the VA-SPD countermeasure model, we
do not need open the SPD to monitor some specific pa-
rameters. Furthermore, the simulation results show that
the fingerprint introduced by the detector control attack
is pretty obvious.
A. Theoretical proof of the criteria
In all detector control attacks without blinding light,
Eve first uses a random basis to measure the quantum
state sent by Alice, then resends a trigger signal to Bob
based on her measurement result. The power of the trig-
ger signals is not in single-photon level, but in multi-
photon level. And the power of the trigger signal stays
the same, regardless of Eve’s measurement result. If Eve
and Bob select matching bases, the trigger signal would
hit one detector with full optical power. If Eve and Bob
select opposite bases, the trigger signal would be split
into two half parts and hit two detectors. According to
the optical power (full, half) hitting the detector and
the attenuation value (0 dB, 3 dB) of the VA-SPD, Pf,0
is defined as the detection probability with full optical
power when the attenuation is 0 dB. Pf,3 is likewise de-
fined when the attenuation is 3 dB; similarly, with half
power, Ph,0 and Ph,3 are defined as the detection prob-
abilities when the attenuation are 0 dB and 3 dB, re-
spectively. Suppose Eve select two measurement basis
with equal probability, the detection rates of Bob’s one
VA-SPD with 0 dB and 3 dB attenuation are given by
Ratk0 =
1
4
Pf,0 +
1
2
Ph,0, (4)
Ratk3 =
1
4
Pf,3 +
1
2
Ph,3. (5)
Here, “atk” means under the detector control attack.
As an acceptable assumption, both detectors in the
same basis are identical here for simplicity. About the
QBER of Bob’s one VA-SPD, it involves the other or
orthogonal detector in the same basis. If both detec-
tors click simultaneously, Bob assigns a random bit value.
Since attenuation values of both VA-SPDs are changed
independently, there are two circumstances: one is both
VA-SPDs have the same attenuation value (0 dB or
3 dB), the other is the attenuation values are opposite
(0 dB & 3 dB, or 3 dB & 0 dB). When both VA-SPDs
have the same attenuation value, the QBER of Bob’s one
VA-SPD with 0 dB and 3 dB attenuation are given by
eatk0(s) =
2Ph,0 − P 2h,0
2Pf,0 + 2(2Ph,0 − P 2h,0)
, (6)
eatk3(s) =
2Ph,3 − P 2h,3
2Pf,3 + 2(2Ph,3 − P 2h,3)
. (7)
For the detector control attack without blinding light,
there are two equivalent situations — one is Eve and
Bob select matching bases and the attenuation value of
the corresponding VA-SPD is 3 dB, the other is Eve and
Bob select opposite bases and the attenuation value of
the VA-SPD is 0 dB. Then we have Ph,0 = Pf,3. From
Eqs. (2),(4) and (5), we get
Pf,0 + 2Ph,0 = α(Pf,3 + 2Ph,3). (8)
If the relationship of Eq. (3) is satisfied, we have
2Ph,0 − P 2h,0 < 2αeth(Ph,0 + 2Ph,3)− 2ethP 2h,0, (9)
α(2Ph,3 − P 2h,3) < 2αeth(Ph,0 + 2Ph,3 − P 2h,3). (10)
By adding both sides of these inequalities, we get
(2− Ph,0 − 4αeth)Ph,0 + α(2− Ph,3 − 8eth)Ph,3 + 2ethP 2h,0 + 2αethP 2h,3 < 0. (11)
It’s obvious that this inequality cannot be satisfied in
condition that 0 ≤ {Ph,0, Ph,3} ≤ 1, 1 < α < 2, and
eth < 11%. Therefore, it is impossible to satisfy the
relationships (Eq. (2) and Eq. (3)) simultaneously under
4the detector control attack.
Similarly, when the attenuation values of VA-SPDs are
opposite, the QBER of Bob’s one VA-SPD with 0 dB and
3 dB attenuation are given by
eatk0(opp) =
2Ph,0 − Ph,0Ph,3
2Pf,0 + 2(2Ph,0 − Ph,0Ph,3) , (12)
eatk3(opp) =
2Ph,3 − Ph,0Ph,3
2Pf,3 + 2(2Ph,3 − Ph,0Ph,3) . (13)
We can also prove that the relationships (Eq. (2) and Eq.
(3)) cannot be satisfied simultaneously through a similar
process.
B. Simulation results if one relationship is satisfied
According to the above proof, the relationships of Eq.
(2) and Eq. (3) cannot be satisfied simultaneously under
the detector control attack. Here, through the approach
of numerical simulation, we show that the violation of
one relationship would be pretty obvious if the other re-
lationship is satisfied. Details of the calculation process
is in Appendix. B.
In the case that the relationship of Eq. (3) is satisfied,
both QBERs (e0 and e3) are less than eth. The bounds
of the ratio between two detection rates are shown in Fig.
2. For the QKD system in normal operation, the ratio
between two detection rates α = R0R3 locates in the yel-
low region (1 < α < 2). While, if the system was under
the detector control attack, the lower bounds of the ratio
between two detection rates are depicted by the red line
and blue dashed line respectively, the red line (
Ratk0(s)
Ratk
3(s)
) cor-
responds to the circumstance that both VA-SPDs in the
same basis have the same attenuation value (denoted as
same), and the blue dashed line (
Ratk0(opp)
Ratk
3(opp)
) corresponds to
the situation that these two attenuation values are oppo-
site (denote as opposite). The slight difference between
the red line and the blue dashed line comes from the dis-
crepancy of QBERs in two circumstance (Eqs. (6)-(7)
and Eqs. (12)-(13)). Obviously, the ratio between two
detection rates under the detector control attack is far
from the secure region, and as a good fingerprint, the
detector control attack would be detected easily. As the
threshold of QBER eth was set smaller, the ratio be-
tween two detection rates would be greater, and farther
from the secure region. Even when eth is 11%, the lower
bounds of in two situation are more than 6.5, which would
be easy to find the attack.
In the case that the relationship of Eq. (2) is satisfied,
the ratio between two detection rates α locates in the
secure region. Fig. 3 illustrates the scales of QBERs with
0 dB (e0) and 3 dB (e3) attenuation. For the system in
normal operation, both e0 and e3 should be less than
FIG. 2. Bound of the ratio between two detection rates when
both QBERs are less than eth.
FIG. 3. Scales of QBERs with 0 dB (e0) and 3 dB (e3)
attenuation when the ratio between two detection rates α
locates in the secure region.
11%, as shown in the yellow region. Under the detector
control attack, though Eve could control transmittance
and number of trigger pulses to guarantee the detection
rates unchanged, QBERs would increase a lot. In Fig.
3, the lines and dashed lines correspond to the situation
that two attenuation values are the same and opposite,
respectively. And, the red ones correspond to α = 2
(upper bound of the ratio between two detection rates),
the blue ones correspond to α = 1 (lower bound of the
ratio). It is obvious that e0 and e3 cannot be in the secure
region together. If one of {e0, e3} was less than 11%, the
other one would be more than 25%. Hence, these values
5of QBER would be very easy to trigger the alarm.
III. EXPERIMENTAL DEMONSTRATION OF
THE COUNTERMEASURE
To show the effectiveness of the countermeasure, we ex-
perimentally apply it against the faint after-gate attack
[18], which is a typical detector control attack without
blinding light. The experimental setup is similar to the
schematic depiction in Fig. 1(b). In the normal oper-
ation, Alice is the sender, who sends a sequence of po-
larization states with a repetition rate of 5 MHz and a
expected photon number µ = 0.1 of each pulse. At Bob’s
site, the random attenuation values of VA in VA-SPD are
0 dB and 3 dB, and the insertion loss of VA is approxi-
mately 0.6 dB, which reduces the original detection effi-
ciency of SPD 12.6% to a equivalent detection efficiency
of VA-SPD 11.0% at 0 dB attenuation. To simplify the
experiment, Bob only monitors the detection events in Z
basis {H,V }, and always sets the same attenuation value
(0 dB or 3 dB) in the corresponding two VA-SPDs (the
VA-SPD of bit “0” is used to detect the H state, the
VA-SPD of bit “1” is used to detect the V state.) Hence,
for the QKD system in the normal operation, the ratio
between two detection rates α = R0R3 is approximately
1.994, and QBERs with 0 dB and 3 dB attenuation val-
ues are 1.82% and 1.91%, respectively. While, under the
faint after-gate attack, Eve becomes the sender, here we
skip the intercept and measurement process for simplic-
ity. Different from Alice, Eve needs first measure the
characteristic of each SPD, and then carefully control
the delay and incident flux of her encoded pulses, the
delay makes these pulses arrive after the gate, and the
incident flux (a few hundreds photons per pulse) offers
superlinearity of the detection probability with full and
half optical powers.
In order to keep the QBERs below the threshold, Eve
chooses the attack positions at the falling edge of 0.74
ns and 0.88 ns for the VA-SPDs of bit “0” and bit “1”,
respectively, and the incident flux of 108 photons per
pulse. After measuring Eve’s encoded pulses in Z ba-
sis, the detection probabilities of Bob’s two VA-SPDs
are listed in TABLE I. Taking the VA-SPD of bit “0”
for example, the detection probabilities with full and half
incident flux are Pf,0 = 0.10675 and Ph,0 = 0.0142, re-
spectively, when the attenuation value is 0 dB, and are
Pf,3 = 0.01415 and Ph,3 = 0.00182 when the attenuation
value is 3 dB. Now the QBERs with two attenuation val-
ues are eatk0(s) = 10.45% and e
atk
3(s) = 10.22%, respectively.
Both QBERs are below the threshold 11%, but the ratio
between two detection rates is
Ratk0(s)
Ratk
3(s)
= 7.60, far beyond
the value in the normal operation. Thus this large ratio
between two detection rates would make Bob detect the
faint after-gate attack easily.
The other attacking strategy is to keep the detection
rates around the values in normal operation. This time
Eve chooses the attack positions at the falling edge of
0.68 ns and 0.84 ns for the VA-SPDs of bit “0” and
bit “1”, respectively, and the incident flux of 300 pho-
tons per pulse. After measuring Eve’s encoded pulses
in Z basis, the detection probabilities of Bob’s two VA-
SPDs are listed in TABLE II. Still taking the VA-SPD
of bit “0” for example, Pf,0 = 0.9999, Ph,0 = 0.5016, and
Pf,3 = 0.5015, Ph,3 = 0.2421. Now the ratio between
two detection rates is
Ratk0(s)
Ratk
3(s)
= 2.03, close to the value in
normal operation. But the QBERs with two attenuation
values are eatk0(s) = 21.46%, e
atk
3(s) = 22.95%, both QBERs
are more than ten times of the ones in normal operation.
Hence this high QBERs would be pretty obvious to find
the trace of Eve.
Compared with normal QKD systems, the insertion
loss of VA and the setting attenuation value would in-
troduce extra attenuation and reduce the key rate. Nev-
ertheless, these impacts can be weakened by choosing
proper device and controlling the probability of setting
attenuation. About the insertion loss of VA, there is no
need to use high-speed intensity modulator since VA is
controlled by Bob. In the experiment, the insertion loss
of VA is only 0.6 dB. About the impact of setting at-
tenuation, the probability of setting 3 dB could be very
low in practice, and we can also reduce the impact of
statistical fluctuation by accumulating longer time.
IV. EFFECTIVENESS AGAINST THE ATTACK
WITH BLINDING LIGHT
In the proof of the criteria of our countermeasure, there
is an assumption that Ph,0 = Pf,3, which holds in the
detector control attack without blinding light, but might
fail in the attacks with blinding light. Hence the criteria
of our countermeasure might not be deduced. However,
in addition to high photocurrent [44], a new fingerprint
would be introduced by the attack with blinding light in
our countermeasure. So the proposed countermeasure is
still effective against the attack with blinding light.
When the continuous-wave (CW) blinding light enters
the VA-SPD, it is first modulated by the VA into full
power or half power as the attenuation value is randomly
set to 0 dB or 3 dB. In order to always blind the SPD,
the modulated half power should be above the blinding
power of the SPD, which is typically about dozens of mi-
crowatt [51]. After the modulated blinding light hits the
avalanche photodiode (APD), it will create a modulated
train of photocurrent. Every time when the attenuation
value of VA changes, a negative (3 dB → 0 dB) or posi-
tive (0 dB → 3 dB) signal will be generated at the output
of the APD. This is the fingerprint left by the blinding
light in the VA-SPD. And due to the relatively strong op-
tical power of the blinding light, this fingerprint is fairly
obvious and easy to be detected. Furthermore, superim-
posed with the capacitive noise of the gated APD, this
fingerprint would exceed the discrimination voltage, and
6TABLE I. Detection probabilities of Bob’s two VA-SPDs when Eve makes both QBERs below the threshold. (a) VA-SPD
of bit “0” with two attenuation values. (b) VA-SPD of bit “1” with two attenuation values. The first column represents the
polarization state sent by Eve.
(a) VA-SPD of bit “0” (b) VA-SPD of bit “1”
Eve→ 0 dB 3 dB 0 dB 3 dB
H 0.10675 0.01415 0.00016 0.00011
+ 0.01413 0.00181 0.0142 0.0018
V 0.0002 0.00019 0.10819 0.0144
− 0.01427 0.00183 0.01416 0.00178
TABLE II. Detection probabilities of Bob’s two VA-SPDs when Eve makes the detection rates around the values in normal
operation. (a) VA-SPD of bit “0” with two attenuation values. (b) VA-SPD of bit “1” with two attenuation values. The first
column represents the polarization state sent by Eve.
(a) VA-SPD of bit “0” (b) VA-SPD of bit “1”
Eve→ 0 dB 3 dB 0 dB 3 dB
H 0.9999 0.5015 0.0009 0.0004
+ 0.5019 0.2417 0.5018 0.2413
V 0.0011 0.0005 0.9999 0.5024
− 0.5012 0.2425 0.5023 0.2415
produce one click (or a few clicks), which has 50% prob-
ability to generate an error bit. Thus, even if we do not
monitor the negative or positive signal at the output of
the APD, the additional clicks introduced by the blind-
ing light would increase the QBER and yield of the QKD
system.
FIG. 4. Experimental demonstration of the effectiveness
of the VA-SPD model against the attack with blinding light.
VA, variable attenuator; BS, beamsplitter; PD: high-speed
photodiode; ATT, optical attenuator; Amp, amplifier; APD,
avalanche photodiode; OSC, oscilloscope.
Although the detector is treated as a blackbox in the
countermeasure model, as shown in Fig. 4, we open a de-
tector and measure the output voltage to experimentally
demonstrate the reason why Eve’s attack with blinding
light would also be found. The CW laser modulated by
the VA is splitted into two parts, one part enters a high-
speed photodiode (PD) to show the characteristic of the
modulated blinding light, the other part is first attenu-
FIG. 5. Results recorded by the oscilloscope. (a) The dead-
time of SPD is 4.5 µs . (b) The deadtime is set to bypass.
The blue lines refer to the modulated blinding light, and the
fuchsine ones refer to the electrical signals at the output of
the APD.
ated by an optical attenuator (ATT) to proper power,
and then enters the APD, whose corresponding electrical
signals are recorded by an oscilloscope to show the char-
acteristic of the fingerprint left by the blinding light. The
7attenuation value of the VA is set to 0 dB or 3 dB, and
the response time of VA is approximately 120 ns. The
SPD is operated at a frequency of 5 MHz, and can be
blinded by a CW light at 1550 nm with a power from 11
µW to 50 µW. The results observed by the oscilloscope
are shown in Fig. 5, the blue lines correspond to the mod-
ulated blinding light, and the fuchsine ones correspond
to the electrical signals at the output of the APD. Here,
the modulated blinding light that enters the APD has
the power of 30 µW (15 µW) when the attenuation value
of VA is 0 dB (3 dB). In Fig. 5(a), the deadtime of SPD
is 4.5 µs, so we can observe the fingerprint left by the
modulated blinding light clearly. Outside the modulated
window, the blinding light is CW, there are only capaci-
tive noises corresponding to the gating pulses. When the
intensity changes from 15 µW to 30 µW, a negative sig-
nal is generated, and then decays during the unchanged
intensity; when the intensity changes from 30 µW to 15
µW, a positive signal is generated, and also then decays
during the unchanged intensity. Superimposed with the
capacitive noises, the negative signal exceeds the discrim-
ination voltage of -838.2 mV , and produces one click. In
Fig. 5(b), the deadtime of SPD is set to bypass, the
negative part superimposed with the capacitive noises
produce about 9 clicks (fuchsine curve). These abnormal
clicks can be easily detected by the VA-SPD, and trigger
the alarm of the QKD system.
V. CONCLUSION
In this paper, we have proposed an effective counter-
measure against the detector control attacks. After intro-
ducing a VA in front of the SPD, the VA-SPD model can
detect the detector control attacks easily through anal-
ysis of the detection rates and QBERs corresponding to
different attenuation values. We first focus on the detec-
tor control attacks without blinding light, which are more
concealed and threatening to QKD systems. The crite-
ria is proved that the relationships of the detection rate
and QBER between 0 dB and 3 dB attenuation cannot
be satisfied simultaneously once the system is hacked. In
this countermeasure model against the detector control
attack, the SPD is treated as a blackbox, we don’t need
open it to monitor some specific parameters. By numeri-
cal simulations and the experimental application against
the faint after-gate attack, we not only demonstrate the
effectiveness of the VA-SPD model, but also show the
obviousness of the fingerprint introduced by Eve. Fur-
thermore, for the detector control attack with blinding
light, we analyse and experimentally test the effective-
ness of the VA-SPD model, in which a new fingerprint
would be introduced in addition to high photocurrent.
The countermeasure can be easily applied to the exist-
ing QKD system, and would provide a perfect balance
between security and practicality.
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APPENDIX A: ANALYSIS OF THE
DIFFERENCE OF VA’S VALUE
In this section, we explain the reason why the VA’s
value should differ 3 dB. Assume that the attenuation
value of VA in each VA-SPD is randomly set to x dB
and y dB (x < y). As mentioned above in Sec. II, after
the announcement of basis choices, {Rx, Ry} and {ex,
ey} denotes the detection rates and QBERs with x dB
and y dB, respectively. For the QKD system in normal
operation, the ratio between detection rates of one VA-
SPD with x dB and y dB attenuation satisfies
α∗ =
Rx
Ry
> 1, (14)
similarly, the QBERs with x dB and y dB attenuation
should be less than the threshold. We get
{ex, ey} < eth. (15)
In detector control attack without blinding light, Pf,x
is defined as the detection probability with full optical
power when the attenuation is x dB. Pf,y is likewise
defined when the attenuation is y dB; similarly, with
half power, Ph,x and Ph,y are defined as the detection
probabilities when the attenuation are x dB and y dB,
respectively. Suppose Eve select two measurement basis
with equal probability. Then the detection rates with
two attenuation values can be given by
Ratkx =
1
4
Pf,x +
1
4
(2Ph,x), (16)
Ratky =
1
4
Pf,y +
1
4
(2Ph,y). (17)
For simplicity, we analyse the case that both VA-SPDs
have the same attenuation value (x dB or y dB). Then
the QBERs of Bob’s one VA-SPD with x dB and y dB
attenuation values are given by
eatkx(s) =
2Ph,x − P 2h,x
2Pf,x + 2(2Ph,x − P 2h,x)
, (18)
8eatky(s) =
2Ph,y − P 2h,y
2Pf,y + 2(2Ph,y − P 2h,y)
. (19)
By substituting Eqs. (16)–(17) into the Eqs. (18)–(19)
respectively, we get
2Ph,x − P 2h,x < 2α∗eth(Pf,y + 2Ph,y)− 2ethP 2h,x, (20)
α∗(2Ph,y − P 2h,y) < 2α∗eth(Pf,y + 2Ph,y − P 2h,y). (21)
By adding both sides of these inequalities, we deduce that
(2Ph,x − P 2h,x)− 4α∗ethPf,y + α∗(2− Ph,y − 8eth)Ph,y + 2ethP 2h,x + 2α∗ethP 2h,y < 0. (22)
As eth < 11%, 0 ≤ {Pf,x, Ph,x, Pf,y, Ph,y} ≤ 1 and
α∗ > 1, we know that (2Ph,x − P 2h,x) + α∗(2 − Ph,y −
8eth)Ph,y + 2ethP
2
h,x + 2α
∗ethP 2h,y ≥ 0, −4α∗ethPf,y ≤ 0.
To make an effective countermeasure criteria, It should
be guaranteed that Eq. (22) can not be satisfied for all
the values of α∗, there are two following cases:
If Ph,x 6= Pf,y, whether the Eq. (22) can be satisfied
depends on the value of Ph,x, Pf,y, α
∗ and Ph,y, which
means that the countermeasure criteria is not general.
If Ph,x = Pf,y, then (2Ph,x − P 2h,x) − 4α∗ethPf,y ≥ 0,
all the factors on the left of Eq. (22) is greater than 0,
which is contradictory to the right result of Eq. (22). It
means the two sub-cases: The one is the optical power
before entering SPDs are equal, then half power with
x dB is equal to the full power with y dB, so the difference
of VA’s value between y and x is 3 dB. It meets the
requirement of generalization of criteria; The other one
is the optical power before entering SPDs are different,
but their detection probabilities are equal. Therefore,
the countermeasure is influenced by the specific detector
probabilities and is not general.
APPENDIX B: CALCULATION PROCESS IF
ONE RELATIONSHIP IS SATISFIED
When both VA-SPDs in the same basis have the same
attenuation value, and in the case that both QBERs
(eatk0(s) and e
atk
3(s)) are less than eth (Eq. (3) is satisfied), in
order to deduce the range of
Ratk0(s)
Ratk
3(s)
, let 1
2eatk
0(s)
− 1 = m1,
1
2eatk
3(s)
− 1 = m2. Then Eqs. (6) and (7) can be converted
into
Pf,0 = m1(2Ph,0 − P 2h,0), (23)
Pf,3 = m2(2Ph,3 − P 2h,3). (24)
With 0 ≤ Pf,0 ≤ 1 and Ph,0 = Pf,3 we get
0 ≤ Ph,0 ≤ 1−
√
1− 1
m1
. (25)
Then
Ratk0(s)
Ratk
3(s)
is given by
Ratk0(s)
Ratk3(s)
=
m1(2Ph,0 − P 2h,0) + 2Ph,0
Ph,0 + 2− 2
√
1− Ph,0
m2
.
(26)
Define m = min{m1,m2}, then m ≥ 12eth − 1. Let 1 −√
1− 1m = x, with Eq. (25) we have
Ratk0(s)
Ratk3(s)
≥ m(2x− x
2) + 2x
x+ 2− 2
√
1− x
m
.
(27)
We can simulate the lower bound of
Ratk0(s)
Ratk
3(s)
, the result is
shown with the red line in Fig. 2.
Similarly, when both VA-SPDs in the same basis have
the opposite attenuation value, and both QBERs (eatk0(opp)
and eatk3(opp)) are less than eth, let
1
2eatk
0(opp)
− 1 = m3,
1
2eatk
3(opp)
− 1 = m4. Then Eqs. (12) and (13) can be
converted into
Pf,0 = m3(2Ph,0 − Ph,0Ph,3), (28)
Pf,3 = m4(2Ph,3 − Ph,0Ph,3). (29)
With Eq. (29), we get Ph,0 =
2m4Ph,3
1+m4Ph,3
, substitute it in
Eq. (28), as 0 ≤ Pf,0 ≤ 1 , we have
0 ≤ 2Ph,3 − P
2
h,3
1 +m4Ph,3
≤ 1
2m3m4
. (30)
Then we get the range of Ph,3
0 ≤ Ph,3 ≤ 4m3m4 −m4 −
√
(4m3m4 −m4)2 − 8m3m4
4m3m4
.
(31)
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Ratk0(opp)
Ratk
3(opp)
is given by
Ratk0(opp)
Ratk3(opp)
=
m3m4(2− Ph,3) + 2m4
m4 + 1 +m4Ph,3
. (32)
Define m = min{m3,m4}, then m ≥ 12eth − 1, we have
Ratk0(opp)
Ratk3(opp)
≥ 4m
2 + 9m+m
√
16m2 − 8m− 7
8m+ 3−√16m2 − 8m− 7 . (33)
We simulate the lower bound of
Ratk0(opp)
Ratk
3(opp)
, the result is
shown with the blue dashed line in Fig. 2.
Under the detector control attack, since Eve could con-
trol transmittance and number of trigger pulses to guar-
antee the detection rates unchanged, t is the attack trans-
mission parameter which satisfies t ≥ 1, then we have
Ratk0 = tR0. (34)
In the case that the relationship of Eq. 2 is satisfied,
(4) and (5) can be converted into
Pf,0 + 2Ph,0 = 4tR0, (35)
Pf,3 + 2Ph,3 =
4tR0
α
. (36)
As 0 ≤ {Pf,0, Ph,0, Pf,3, Ph,3} ≤ 1, by using Eqs. (35)
and (36), we have
0 ≤ tR0 ≤ 0.75. (37)
When both VA-SPDs in the same basis have the same
attenuation value, then eatk0(s), e
atk
3(s) can be converted into
eatk0(s) =
2Ph,0 − P 2h,0
8tR0 − 2P 2h,0
, (38)
eatk3(s) =
2Ph,3 − P 2h,3
8tR0
α
− 2P 2h,3
. (39)
According Eq. (39) and Eq. (36), we get
Pf,3 = Ph,0 =
1 +
4tR0
α
eatk3(s) −
2tR0
α
−
√
(1 +
4tR0
α
eatk3(s) −
2tR0
α
)2 + 2(eatk3(s) −
1
2
)2(
8tR0
α
− 8( tR0
α
)2)
eatk3(s) −
1
2
, (40)
thus we substitute Eq. (40) to Eq. (38). We can simulate
the relationship of the QBERs with 0 dB (eatk0(s)) and 3 dB
(eatk3(s)), we set tR0 = 0.75 for Eq. (37), because e
atk
0(s) and
eatk3(s) are increasing with decreasing tR0. If Eq. (40) is
larger than 1 (smaller than 0), we take 1(0) for Pf,3. The
result is shown with red and blue lines in Fig. 3.
Similarly, when both VA-SPDs in the same basis have
the opposite attenuation value, eatk0(opp), e
atk
3(opp) can be con-
verted into
eatk0(opp) =
2Ph,0 − Ph,0Ph,3
8tR0 − 2Ph,0Ph,3 , (41)
eatk3(opp) =
2Ph,3 − Ph,0Ph,3
8tR0
α
− 2Ph,0Ph,3
.
(42)
According Eqs. (36) and (42), we get Ph,3 =
2tR0
α
−
1
2
Pf,3.
Pf,3 = Ph,0 =
2tR0
α
+ 1− 4tR0
α
eatk3(opp) −
√
(
4tR0
α
eatk3(opp) −
2tR0
α
− 1)2 − 4(eatk3(opp) −
1
2
)2(
8tR0
α
)
1− 2eatk3(opp)
.
(43)
Take these equation to Eq. (41). We can simulate the relationship of the QBERs with 0 dB (eatk0(opp)) and 3 dB
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(eatk3(opp)), we set tR0 = 0.75 for Eq. (37), because e
atk
0(opp)
and eatk3(opp) are increasing with decreasing tR0. Similarly,
if Eq. (40) is larger than 1(smaller than 0), we take 1(0)
for Pf,3. The result is shown with red and blue dashed
lines in Fig. 3.
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